The impact of disease on warfare has often changed the course of conflicts and, in turn, shaped the fate of nations. The lesson that disease among troops can be more disabling than the battles themselves emerges as a recurring theme throughout the history of warfare, and this is particularly well illustrated in the war archives of Edward 'Ted' Ford, held in the History of Medicine Library. Through reading his many letters and diary entries written during the fateful period of 1942-44 - when Japanese forces invaded but were eventually repelled by the combined power of Australian and US Forces - it is clear that Ted Ford played a major role in that victory through his work as a pathologist and malariologist to the Australian Army's New Guinea Force.

Sent to New Guinea as Assistant Director of Pathology, New Guinea Force, Ford arrived in Port Moresby on Sept 17, 1942. Well aware of the threat posed by disease, he was keen to survey the Australian troops at Milne Bay. They had just inflicted the first major defeat of Japanese land forces in the region, but had also been greatly infected by malaria outbreaks. However, Ford was hampered in his mission and wasn't able to travel to Milne Bay until 16th of November, prevented from doing so on the grounds of an 'apparent' shortage of air transport, of which he wrote: 'This reflects very fully the general attitude to malaria in the force.' After his repeated requests for air transport were denied, (by Brigadier John Broadbent), Ford finally sailed for Milne Bay on the AHS Manunda where 'The inevitable picture forecasted before occupation of the area was displayed in all its colours.'

Distressed by the devastation unfolding in Milne Bay, Ted sought and was granted an interview with General Thomas Blamey, Commander in Chief, on the 4th of December. The scene is described in 'No memory for pain' by Kingsley Norris:

'The General had allotted 15 minutes and when Ted entered he began in his quiet, slow, high voice to tell General Blamey about malaria and armies...After about an hour, the General looked up and said: I think I understand you, Colonel Ford. If I don't do all these things you are advising, my troops will suffer' to which Ford replied 'what I've been trying to tell you, Sir, is that if you don't do these things, you won't have any bloody troops to suffer'

Based on the interview, Ford produced a 'Report of Subject of an interview ordered by the Commander-in-Chief' which left Blamey in no doubt of what was required. Fortunately, support from Blamey was immediate and a radical change in policy was initiated, but as with all new programs, it took time for the policy to filter down to the troops on the ground. Army bureaucracy and miscommunication were part of the problem but non-compliance by troops also added to the challenges in implementing the preventative methods for malaria control. Ford laid the responsibility for malaria control on the Officers in charge and individual troops, noting that if penalties were not enforced for non-compliance, the plan would fail. On the 10th of December, in a letter home, he wrote that:

There is much to do and malaria, particularly, gives plenty of worry. There is not yet a deep (if any) consciousness, that this can wipe us right up as effectively as any enemy, and there is not the thought, and action (naturally enough) applied to it that such a menace warrants. Though there will have to be - spending a lot of time on this - and a bit of recent action will, I hope, bring speedy results, as far as the attitude is concerned...

After reading the report, Ian Mackerras, Director of Entomology for New Guinea Force, wrote to Ford on the 29th Dec 1942, commenting that it made "interesting but extremely depressing reading". Mackerras viewed Milne Bay "as a testing ground on which all our plans and all our methods will have to stand or fall, with consequent repercussions on the planning of the whole campaign. If we cannot succeed there with no action going on, then the powers that be will have to plan their future operations, like they did in the Jordan in the last war, with a definite time limit for malarialisation of the force involved."

Blamey's response to Ford's advice gave the Allied troops an edge over the Japanese forces - who were estimated to have lost 10% of their troops to malaria over the course of the conflict. With many working alongside Ford to provide the solution to the malaria problem, the disease was eventually bought under control in the Milne Bay area and beyond, although things would prove more challenging in some of the swampier areas of New Guinea. Ford acknowledged many of the leading protagonists in his letters:

I have had Neil Fairley and Bill Keogh with me - than whom there are not a more helpful pair in the things I am doing - together with good company generally. Nobody (or few) realise what they do - and the tremendously important things they carry out constantly. Literally the very existence of forces sometimes depends on them. Good men to meet at any time.

In March 1943, Lieut.-Colonel Ford was officially appointed as an Australian Army Malariologist along with Majors J. C. English and F. J. Fenner. Together, their official status helped to raise the profile of anti-malarial work and along with the use of the prophylactic drug mepacrine, the malaria rate in highly malarious areas fell to 26 per 1000 troops by November 1944. Eventually, the New Guinea Force's malaria methods were adopted by General Macarthur's US Army forces in the South Pacific as well as by the forces under Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Commander of South-East Asia.